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I. INTRODUCTION
Through its long and distinguished history of constructive criti-
cism of tort law, the American Law Institute (ALI) has been a fo-
rum for spirited discussion of the law, with its drafts providing a
repository of competing views represented by careful scholarship.
A new study recently offered to the Institute bids fair to generate
much discussion, in part because its views require further tempering
by the facts.
The work, a "Reporters' Study" (the Study) entitled Enterprise
Responsibility for Personal Injury,1 is grand in its ambition and fre-
quently provocative in its execution. The process by which the Re-
porters came to bring their study to the floor of the ALI for
discussion merits separate discussion. This essay focuses on a single
chapter in the Study as an example of insufficient consideration of
competing points of view in legal scholarship.
I shall principally analyze the chapter titled "Product Defects and
Warnings."' This subject presents one of the principal focal points of
the Study,3 as well as being a topic of expanding commentary for
more than a quarter century. I found it particularly interesting as a
subject for commentary because of my own ongoing scholarship in
the field.4
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1. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY ON ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBIL-
iTY FOR PERSONAL INJURY (1991) [hereinafter ALI STUDY].
2. 2 ALl STUDY, supra note 1, ch. 2.
3. See 1 ALl STUDY, supra note 1, at 9-10.
4. See, e.g., 1 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY (2d ed.
II. Too FEW PAGES OF HISTORY
The opening paragraphs of the chapter, although concededly aim-
ing at condensation of complex historical material, appear to betray
a certain lack of sophistication and mastery of the historical com-
plexity of the subject. For example, in the first paragraph of the
chapter, the Reporters declare that in addition to warranty liability,
"[b]eginning in the 1920's manufacturers were . . . liable in negli-
gence regardless of the absence of privity of contract between de-
fendant and plaintiff."5 Curiously, this statement, which is
essentially repeated in a footnote in the next paragraph,6 cites for its
only support the 1916 case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.
7
More generally, one should note as a matter of historical texture
that MacPherson was only the first of a long line of cases in which
state supreme courts fell into line on negligence liability without
privity over a period of many years. 8
One can appreciate the desire of the Reporters to avoid reinvent-
ing the historical wheel while one laments the inaccuracy of a pres-
entation that comes close to caricature. The authors say that the
criticism of "[t]his common law of defective products"-apparently,
the warranty-based law-rested "on two related grounds." These
grounds, the authors say, centered on the seller's ability to disclaim
implied warranties and on the other requirements of the "sales law,"
particularly the notice requirement and the privity barrier. The re-
sult, the authors tell us, was that since victims "of unfit products"
could seldom sue their makers in warranty, "unregulated consumer
markets allocated product defect risks inefficiently and unfairly."9
The Reporters make no reference to perceived problems of proof,
and to judicial concern about the intellectual games that accompa-
nied certain applications of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. More-
over, they speak not at all of the belief that consumers were at a
serious informational disadvantage in products cases, a most serious
omission in light of the fact that so much economic theory is imbed-
ded in the chapter. In an especially glaring omission, they do not
refer to any of the concerns about the nature of product representa-
tions, product appearance or consumer assumptions that were evi-
dent at the dawn of the modern development of strict liability for
products.10
1990 & Supps. 1991, 1992).
5. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 34.
6. Id. at 34 n.4.
7. 111 N.E. 1050, 217 N.Y. 382 (1916).
8. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
682-83 (5th ed. 1984).
9. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 34.
10. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 337 P.2d 897,
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Continuing the exaggerated strokes of their caricature, the Re-
porters move the reader quickly forward: "In the early 1960's the
American Law Institute helped to create a new form of strict liabil-
ity."'" There is no sense of the historical elision from warranty to
tort that took place in the early sixties. This lack of historical focus
is not the only defective aspect of the Reporters' summary of the
development of strict liability and tort for products. The Reporters
go on to say that besides rendering disclaimers unenforceable, the
strict liability doctrine created a situation in which "procedural rules
that limit a defendant's liability, such as the requirement that there
be privity of contract . . . are inapplicable."'" To say the least, the
reference to the privity requirement as a "procedural" rule is an un-
conventional characterization.
Most remarkably, the Reporters assert in a summary of the devel-
opment of strict liability theory that the doctrine "meant that the
maker of a 'defective' product had to compensate any person who
was injured by it."' 3 They declare that "[tihis version of strict liabil-
ity was adopted almost everywhere in the United States."' 4 This
characterization is so inaccurate that it introduces some doubt as to
the concept of strict liability that guides the Study generally. Among
other things, it fails to take into account a large body of products
law based on the conduct of plaintiffs, utilizing concepts that include
contributory neglience, assumption of risk and misuse.
The flawed nature of the Study's historical lens is evident in the
very next paragraph. The Reporters assert that "[w]hile the law ex-
plicitly authorized actions based on defects in manufacture, it gener-
ally neglected the hazards in a product's design."' 5 The Study cites
as authority for this proposition a historical intent argument that it
attributes to Professor Priest.' 6 There is, one hardly need add, no
"explicit" declaration in section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts that limits the reach of the section to manufacturing de-
fects, nor one that excludes design defects.
At least as curious is the next assertion in the text. The Reporters
say that the courts then "expanded the substantive basis of strict
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).





16. Id. (referring to George Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent,
10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2361 (1989)).
liability: a manufacturer became liable for injuries caused by defec-
tively designed as well as defectively manufactured products."' 7
Oddly, this statement relies on one decision: Larsen v. General Mo-
tors Corp.'8 The Reporters have part of the analysis right: Larsen
did involve allegations of poor design, but those allegations, as sum-
marized in the first sentence of the Eighth Circuit's decision, invoked
negligence theory and not strict liability. 9 It also rings unharmoni-
cally to cite Larsen, a 1968 case, for the proposition that "[b]y the
1970's," having "come to believe that the prevalent approach to the
new form of strict liability was too limiting . . . . [T]he courts ex-
panded the substantive basis of strict liability."20
The Study then proceeds to summarize "the current taxonomy of
defective products," which it divides conventionally into "'manufac-
turing defect[s]'" and "'design defect[s].' "121 One would have
hoped that in a critique that aims to be authoritative, there would be
some critical analysis of this traditional dichotomy. Thus, the au-
thors might have noted that there is a considerable overlap between
the concepts of manufacturing defect and design defect. For exam-
ple, many quality control decisions that lead to "manufacturing de-
fects" represent the same kind of strategic choice which informs
design decisions.
The authors describe a product as having a "design defect" when
"an appropriately safer design was feasible when the product was
marketed. 22 This bald, simplistic statement does not take into ac-
count the rich matrix of thought that courts and commentators have
applied to the design defect question.23 The authors only hint at the
character of this fabric of commentary in their statement that "[t]he
law now has a set of 'defect tests'" on the design question.24 Most
generally, and most critically, I must invoke a sense of the feel and
texture of this summary: it gives the reader a sense of a kind of a
"Dick and Jane" rehearsal of the law, which does not even begin to
capture the dimensions of the judicial struggle in what is, after all, a
difficult task.
17. Id.
18. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
19. The court summarized the case as involving "an alleged negligent design of the
steering system of [an] automobile." Id. at 496.
20. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 35.
21. Id. at 36.
22. Id.
23. See generally 1 SHAPo, supra note 4, at ch. 9; see also id. at l 8.04[3]-[5]
(summarizing various defect tests).
24. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 36.
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III. THE DUTY TO WARN
The authors next confront the problem of liability for failure to
warn, keying their discussion with the statement that "[a] product
may also have a 'warning defect.' "25 Although one can never be cer-
tain of proving a negative about a lack of authority, I am not sure
that I have ever encountered this term.
The difficulty inherent in the term is evident in cases of this sort:
A plaintiff harmed by a product claims that a defendant did not
warn of a hazard known to it when the plaintiff used the product.
There may be four types of questions here: Did the defendant know
of the hazard? Was the hazard one that required notification to the
consumer? If it was, did the defendant provide an adequate caution-
ary notice based on the information? With the cautionary notice,
was the product reasonably safe for use? The first question is a
straight negligence question, which arguably is conceptually divisible
from typical "warnings" issues. The second and third questions in-
volve issues concerning "duty to warn" and negligence in failing to
warn adequately. Only the fourth question is a "defect" question.
When judges use the rubric of warnings, they seem-and rather sen-
sibly-to satisfy themselves with putting the questions of whether
there was a duty to warn and whether a communicated warning was
adequate.26
The authors' general summary of the law on warnings implies that
the giving of a warning on risk levels will exculpate the seller.27 But
unless the notion of "the risk level" is an impossibly broad one, it is
not at all clear that warnings of risk levels will be exculpatory. And
in any event, it certainly is not clear that this should be so as a
theoretical matter. The authors do declare that "[r]isk level warn-
ings . . . cannot substitute for technologically feasible product im-
provements." Though employing a rather prissy example-"a tractor
maker that announced that its tractors not infrequently roll
over"-they note that many states would impose liability, despite
such a warning, "if a more stable design or safety modification were
25. Id.
26. Compare the Reporters' statement that "the concept of 'defect' utilized in
product design or warning litigation incorporates the key elements of standard negligence
law by asking whether, given the state of the art at the time, the manufacturer's design
or warning decision created an unreasonable risk of consumer injury." 2 ALI STUDY,
supra note 1, at 39.
27. "[A] well made product has a warning defect if the producer fails to inform
consumers of the risk level that the product poses. Conversely, an adequate warning will
preclude such liability." Id. at 36-37.
feasible. 28
One may observe, in passing, that the authors seem to accept un-
critically the commingling of "instructions for safe use" and warn-
ings. 29 The distinction between these categories, if not entirely crisp,
has commended itself to courts.30
The authors' summary of the law on failure to warn is somewhat
baffling. They say that "a product has a warning defect if (1) it is
unavoidably unsafe and the manufacturer failed to warn about the
risk level; or (2) it is improvable and the manufacturer failed to give
appropriate instructions in safe use."31 This classification system
presents at least two problems. First, the term "unavoidably unsafe"
has come to be a term of art, which has been used essentially to
immunize manufacturers of products that merit that label.32 Sec-
ondly, the two categories hardly seem airtight as against each other.
The authors do take into account the possibility of liability in cases
where it is foreseeable "that safety instructions will on occasion be
ignored." 33
A general observation about the Study's treatment of the warn-
ings question is that when courts speak of "strict" liability for failure
to warn, they appear to have developed a hybrid concept. The au-
thors make clear that the law on warnings allows defendants sub-
stantial leeway to argue that there is no liability because there was
no negligence.3 4 One should emphasize that this seems to be quan-
titatively a very important category, accounting for a substantial
amount of sensible case law.
IV. AN "ABSOLUTE LIABILITY" CONTRIVANCE
The authors present as one alternative to liability for "design de-
fect[s]" a theory of "absolute liability subject to a contributory neg-
ligence defense."3 5 I hope it is not quibbling to point out that this
terminology presents a contradiction in terms, at least if those terms
are the traditional legal usages of these words. The phrase "absolute
liability," as I understand it, signifies a form of liability that is not
subject to a contributory negligence defense. The authors' commen-
tary on this subject makes some interesting theoretical points, but it
would have been more convincing had it framed those points in more
practical terms.
28. Id. at 37.
29. See id. at 37-38.
30. See 1 SHAPo, supra note 4, at 19.01[2][a] (discussion of authorities).
31. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 38.
32. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A cmt. k (1965).
33. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 38.
34. See id. at 39.
35. See id. at 41, pt. A(1).
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A more substantive concern is that the authors give no evidence
for their assertion that "the imposition of absolute liability could in-
crease moral hazard and therefore accident costs, notwithstanding
the defense of contributory negligence."3 6 Apart from confusion
about terminology, it is unclear what the behavioral assumptions are
behind this assertion, and the authors present no empirical evidence
for it.
V. DISMISSIVENESS ON CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS
The authors' broadside at the consumer expectations test for de-
fect, referring to the "uninformed safety expectations" of "unin-
formed consumers," hardly makes the case that the test is
"arbitrary."31 The authors do not give even implicit credence to the
conditioning of consumer safety expectations by advertising. Almost
20 years ago, this writer showed at length how product portrayals
influence courts responding to complaints under nonrepresentational
theories as well as representational doctrines.3 8 In this connection, it
seems fair to observe that the authors might at least have noted the
view that judges decide how safe products ought to be, whereas ju-
ries might be left to decide only what expectations really were.39 One
may also note, in passing, that a principal provision in the European
products liability directive, recently minted as a standard for the en-
tire European Community, defines a product as "defective when it
does not provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect,"
with one of three named relevant circumstances to be considered be-
ing "the presentation of the product."4
With respect to the consumer expectations test, the authors rely
on only one extravagant example: "a consumer drives a car into a
lake and is injured when it sinks," and "testifies honestly that he had
believed the car would float."4 The authors comment that "[t]he
36. Id. at 42.
37. Id. at 44.
38. See generally Marshall S. Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer
Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA.
L. REV. 1113, 1204-80 (1974) (demonstrating the influence of product promotion on de-
cisions under negligence, warranty and strict liability doctrines).
39. See, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 473, 435 P.2d 806, 809
(1987).
40. Council of the European Communities, Council Directive of Liability for De-
fective Products, Offic. J. Eur. Communities, L 210/29 (Aug. 7, 1985) §§ 6, 6(a).
41. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 44.
consumer's expectation is unreasonable . . . because the safety fea-
ture that the consumer said he expected would fail any conceivable
risk-utility test." This provides a basis for their assertion that the
consumer expectations notion "has no independent existence," but
"rather it collapses into other tests or legal rules. 42 The authors
here again neglect the central importance of the process by which
expectations are created-by media, among other forces. One should
note that even if we focus, for example, on risk-benefit analysis
rather than "consumer expectations," the techniques of product pro-
motion are central to consumer formulation of the calculus of risks
and benefits. It is perhaps telling that the authors present no real
examples of the problem to which their analysis addresses itself.
It is true that some judicial decisions feature confusing conflations
of defect concepts. However, the authors' single example of this kind
of conceptual shifting is an odd one. They cite a case involving a
tampon, in which they quote the court to the effect that "any user of
an o.b. [brand] tampon, including [the plaintiff], could reasonably
expect, and had every right to expect, that the use of the product
would not lead to a serious (or perhaps fatal) illness." The authors
further quote the decision on the proposition that after having heard
expert testimony that the "tampon was defective in design," the jury
could "reasonably conclude that the tampon had failed to meet con-
sumer expectations as to safety. '43 One may at least wonder why
"any user of an o.b. tampon" would not have a reasonable expecta-
tion that the product will not cause a serious illness. The authors'
selection of this illustration seems, if anything, to point up the value
of a consumer expectations test.
The authors complain that sometimes "courts let juries speculate
without guidance as to whether it would be 'reasonable' to expect a
different design."" They cite as "[a]n egregious example of this
technique" a California case, Campbell v. General Motors Corp.4'
This writer would only comment that it is at least an open question
as to whether Campbell relies heavily, if at all, on a consumer expec-
tations test for which it is condemned as "egregious." 4
The authors contend that "[a] defect test such as this which com-
monly collapses into risk-utility analysis is superfluous and confusing
42. 2 ALI STuDY, supra note 1, at 45.
43. Id. at 46, n.19 (quoting West v. Johnson & Johnson Products, Inc., 174 Cal.
App. 3d 831, 866, 220 Cal. Rptr. 437, 458 (1985)).
44. Id. at 46.
45. Id. (citing Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224,
184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982)).
46. See, e.g., 32 Cal. 3d at 118-19, 694 P.2d at 227-28, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 894-95
(appearing to focus principally on the risk-benefit prong of the standard announced in
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978),
rather than on the consumer expectations branch of Barker).
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in application."4 It is not clear why an independent consumer expec-
tations test cannot be conditioned on a consumer who takes costs and
benefits into account. And, again, it is important to understand that
the most crucial part of the process is the creation of expectations by
modern advertising and product portrayal.
In addition to condemning the consumer expectations test for its
alleged superfluousness to the risk-utility test, the authors also com-
plain that sometimes "the consumer expectations test collapses into
the express warranty test or the test for fraud.""8 It would seem that
the more important point is that cases decided under the negligence
and strict liability headings often subtly reflect the nonexpress war-
ranty and nonfraud uses of product portrayals.
The authors further express their concern that courts are able to
use a consumer expectations test to buttress a strict form of liability
in warnings cases, because that test "permits a jury to find that a
product was less safe than the reasonable consumer would expect
when there was no warning against the danger in question, even
though the maker neither knew or should have known of that dan-
ger." 49 It would appear that the important point in such cases is that
the courts are imposing strict liability, and that one would want to
confront that question directly, 0 rather than focusing on an ancil-
lary concern about the use of consumer expectations language.
VI. RISK-UTILITY TEST
The authors criticize the use of the risk-utility test in defect analy-
sis,51 discerning a "pronounced family resemblance between design
defect law and the famous Learned Hand negligence calculus." 52
They do not indicate that Learned Hand-type tests may implicitly
embody behavioral assumptions concerning comparative access to
information.
47. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 46.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 47.
50. See, e.g., Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 36, 402 N.E.2d 194, 199
(1980), in which the court distinguishes its imposition of strict liability in the transfusion
hepatitis case of Cunningham v. MacNeal Mem'l Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 216 N.E.2d 897
(1970), on grounds that that case involved "a defect in a product" as contrasted with a
situation where "a warning may be required because a product is unavoidably unsafe."
The court in Woodill emphasizes the need to place a "logical limit" on strict liability in
the prescription drug setting. See 79 Ill. 2d at 37, 402 N.E.2d at 199-200.
51. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 47-51.
52. Id. at 48, n.24 (citing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., Inc., 159 F.2d 169
(2d Cir. 1947)).
Moreover, they do not appear to take into account the fact that
the negligence standard of reasonableness, as actually applied by
courts, encompasses factors other than efficiency: factors such as
fairness, and even the appropriateness of spreading.
The authors criticize the risk-utility test as "apparently per-
mit[ting] juries to overrule buyers when deciding whether a product
has sufficient social utility." They deem this "an error because a
product has sufficient social utility if informed consumers are willing
to purchase it given its cost, including accident costs."15 3 It is perhaps
informative, if hardly dispositive, for a teacher of the subject to note
that he argues to his classes the point of view espoused by the au-
thors, but that he has noticed that he does not appear to be able to
convince very many students that "[t]his is an error."
The authors also condemn the rationalization of the risk-utility
test on the basis of "the comparative abilities of the parties to spread
losses or insure against them." They declare that "in the view of
almost anyone who has thought seriously about this issue in recent
years . . . the primary function of product liability law is not to
make the manufacturer the insurer of all product-related harms. 54
One might counter that "almost anyone who has thought seriously
about this issue" at all would say that this sentence sets up a straw
person. The attribution of an emphasis on spreading to "[a]dvocates
of the risk-utility test ' 55 appears to give more emphasis to spreading
than those advocates give.56 However, taking this point on its own
ground, the authors do not deal with the fact of the persuasive power
that the spreading rationale has exerted over some courts.
VII. INSURANCE
In further criticism of the risk-utility test, the authors deal with
the relationship of tort law and insurance. From their straw person
declaration that "tort law is a poor vehicle for delivering insurance
services" 57 they proceed to a declaration that "[m]oral hazard and
risk diversification concerns . . . suggest that producers are poor in-
surers." 58 However, it appears that the authors leap rather quickly to
53. Id. at 48-49.
54. Id. at 49.
55. Id.
56. The authors attribute the "classic exposition of this view" to Justice Traynor's
separate opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 462, 150 P.2d 436
(1944). Id. at 49 n.27. But besides referring to the ability of manufacturers to insure
and to distribute risk, that opinion also speaks of the manufacturer's comparative advan-
tage in avoiding product hazards, the unpreparedness of accident victims to deal with the
consequences of injuries and the potential of "overwhelming misfortune" to victims. 24
Cal. 2d at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J., concurring in the judgment).
57. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 50.
58. Id.
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the proposition that "producers cannot monitor consumer use of
their products. '5 9 In fact, in the very process of design, producers
generate a pretty good statistical idea about how their products will
be used. It would seem also that their constant use of marketing
surveys helps them to determine how products are employed by con-
sumers in real life. And, of course, they have access to accident re-
ports and claims.
In a particularly puzzling sentence, the authors declare that
"[requiring producers to insure consumers on an absolute liability
or no-fault basis would . . . pose serious moral hazard concerns."'60
Unless this is simply another straw person, it is unclear what the
target is of the authors' concern about "absolute liability," and it is
even less clear how "no-fault" terminology finds its way into this
critique. Moreover, given the seriousness of many product injuries,
one has to wonder which "moral hazard" it is that concerns the au-
thors. One might infer that their concern is that product users will
frequently be suicidal.
The authors declare that "it is not feasible for a firm to act as an
insurer when risks are highly correlated," because in such situations,
a firm will not be able to "'diversify its risks'" by employing "off-
setting risks" in its "portfolio." 61 Again, the Delphic nature of the
authors' concerns bedevils the reader. What set of litigations is the
focus of concern? Could it be asbestos? One of the associate Report-
ers for the Project that produced the Study made clear the justifica-
tion for lawsuits in that "highly correlated" group of risks.6 2 Did the
authors have any other groups of risks in mind?
Many courts and commentators properly concern themselves with
the justice of imposing a true strict liability for recurrent risks that
are concentrated within a single industry. Yet, in noting the serious-
ness of that question, one must observe that the authors appear to be
focusing on a set of cases in which the defendants frequently were at





62. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
"Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 849 (1984).
VIII. OFF TO SEE THE STRAW PERSON
In another of the sentences in the chapter so tantalizing concern-
ing the authors' meaning, they declare that "whenever there is a
substantial time lag between purchase of a product and manifesta-
tion of the losses it causes, a meaningful linkage between the two
through product prices is very difficult to maintain." 3 It is not clear
where this statement points. It would seem astonishing that the au-
thors mean that producers should be able to get away with anything
when a product hazard has a long tail. It would have been helpful if
they had been clearer about their operational conclusion. In the very
next sentence, the authors say that "using the tort system primarily
as a vehicle to insure those whose health is risked in any way by a
product is an unwise undertaking." '64 Here, the straw person of tort
as a vehicle for "insurer" liability again comes bounding down the
Yellow Brick Road, like a character from the Wizard of Oz.
The authors' attack on cost-benefit analysis employs as a cause
celebre a New Jersey case involving above-ground swimming pools.05
This is a point of legal history and policy judgment on which reason-
able persons might differ. It does seem that the authors make a great
deal more of the case itself than of the more significant and more
recent development, that of the "retreat"6 6 from more extreme forms
of strict liability, including the retreat in New Jersey.
7
The authors now rehearse a motif that sounds in several places
elsewhere in the Study, with a reference to "the perspective, infor-
mation and expertise" possessed by the "well staffed regulatory
agency."6 8 They do not suggest which agencies possess these quali-
ties and which have consistently employed them. This reference to
agency expertise reveals a fundamental weakness that was evident
from the beginning of the Project that produced the Study: a weak-
ness rooted in the obsession with comparative institutional analysis
that provided so much of the intellectual framework of the very first
"Progress Report" that launched the Study."9 There is no evidence
in the chapter that regulatory agencies have proved superior to liti-
gants in providing courts with socially important information con-
cerning product hazards. Moreover, the authors evince no
recognition of the value of the litigation system as a decentralized
63. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 51.
64. Id. at 51-52.
65. O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983).
66. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 54 n.32.
67. See, e.g., 1 SHAPo, supra note 4, at I 19.09[3][b][ii].
68. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 54.
69. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY FOR PRODUCT
AND PROCESS INJURIES PROGRESS REPORT 11-25 (1987).
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watchdog on new syndromes of injury and illness. The authors' dis-
cussion of federal product regulation in a prior chapter"0 only tends
to underline the relative poverty of regulation in practice as con-
trasted with what one infers is the authors' ideal image of a regula-
tory regime.
IX. THE JURY
The authors also express concern about jurors who are reluctant to
do the bidding of the high priests of efficiency. 71 They seem to ex-
hibit no recognition that this attitude of jurors may exist because the
law of torts, including the law of products liability, reflects a deter-
rence focus that departs from notions of economic optimality.7 2 Cer-
tainly in this chapter, and so far as I can tell from a less intensive
reading of the thirty-odd other chapters in the full Study, the Re-
porters give no credence to this approach, nor do they even take any
account of it. To paraphrase Holmes, one must recognize that the
law of products liability does not enact the latest definition of eco-
nomic efficiency in the Journal of Law and Economics.
The Study would have benefitted from a recognition that the prin-
cipal role of juries in design defect cases is to say what designs are
unacceptable. 73 At some level of generality, everyone would agree
with the authors' statement about the "limited capacities of courts
and juries to make design-related decisions. 74 However, the authors
would have presented a more balanced argument if they had more
explicitly recognized the ability of both judges and juries to say what
is wrong, as contrasted with what is right.
The authors declare, unqualifiedly, that designs "should be
deemed defective if and only if there was a feasible alternative de-
sign which, consistent with the consumer's expected use of the prod-
uct, would have avoided the particular injury, and if the costs of the
alternative design are less than the costs of the injuries thereby
avoidable."' 75 Considering the many products that could be put on
the market which would be extraordinarily dangerous but for which
there are no substitutes, this seems a remarkably wooden test. One
70. See I ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 280-83.
71. See 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 52-54.
72. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N., TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE
CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW
4-3 to 4-12 (1984) (M. Shapo Reporter).
73. See, e.g., 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 56-57.
74. Id. at 80.
75. Id. at 56.
cannot help thinking, reading this line of criticism, that the authors
verge on the belief that if a product is useful and does not have a
flaw like a metallurgical flaw, there should be no suit allowed for
injuries that occur from its use.
One might add, interstitially, that there appears to run through
the chapter a generalized hostility to the role of juries. There is now
much research in progress on jury performance. One might observe
that there will be plenty of time to consider whether the Seventh
Amendment should be changed, but that it seems inappropriate to
approach that question sub silentio because of canker about the
evolution of a particular area of the law.
X. WARNINGS AND THE PROCESS OF COMMUNICATION
One of the most significant problems to which the Study addresses
itself is the nature of the communication process for warnings. The
authors' approach to this subject appears to comprehend a group of
three somewhat overlapping categories. In this universe, there are
(1) rational consumers, who can effectively assess data on risk, (2)
consumers who "vary widely in their prior experience, ability to
read, ability to use tools and the like," and (3) a presumably large
set of people who cannot process data as jurors.7 6 To pause at the
role of the juror once more, one certainly gets the sense that the
authors disapprove of leaving warnings questions to the jury without
expert testimony. One may wonder if there lurks here a belief that
the warnings problem is so complex that it is inappropriate to assign
it to juries, although jurors every day decide cases of considerable
complexity. Since jurors are basically a sample of the general con-
sumer population, such a view would pose problems for economic
theory-which must rely on the ability of consumers to make mean-
ingful product choices-not to mention democratic theory.
A process concerned with the finding of specific facts should be
extended as far as it can be in the determination of the particular
impacts on consumers of specific warnings. However, a reading of
the text on "effective communication"78 leads this reader to wonder
whether the problem of product warnings does not bend back upon
the question of whether consumers' general expectations of products
have been justified. If that is so, then it would appear the authors
have been too quick to be dismissive of the "consumer expectations"
test.
76. See id. at 52-61 (quoted clause at 59-60).
77. See id. at 61.
78. See, e.g., id. at 60-61.
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In discussing the difficulty of estimating the effectiveness of warn-
ings, the authors suggest that "more deference should be paid to ex-
perts on this subject. 17 9 This stimulates the question of why, given
the incentives of adversary litigation, one does not find more use of
experts in the cases. Should one be reluctant to suggest that this
might be because counsel and courts are inclined to trust the good
sense of jurors on warnings issues? Whether that suggestion per-
suades the reader or not, it does seem that the authors should try to
explain, or at least to speculate, on why the decisions have mani-
fested so relatively few attempts to use social science in this arena.
XI. THE PROBLEM WITH WARNINGS LAW AND THE PROBLEMS OF
THE REPORT
There is a good case to be made that, within the universe of prod-
ucts cases, there is a relative unpredictability about the results in
litigation about duties to warn.s0 However, the crucial question
would appear to be whether, on balance, the current law provides
socially destructive incentives either to provide unnecessarily florid
warnings, or not to sell useful products. A useful way to classify the
issue is to pose it as one of the distribution of uncertainty: should
consumers bear the burden of uncertainty with respect to the risk of
injury or should producers bear that burden with respect to the risk
of liability? One should at least note that there are certain advan-
tages in imposing a significant amount of that burden on producers,
who have the resources to make changes in products."s The authors
fix reasonably on the problem inherent in the fact that "there is al-
most always an instruction that in retrospect would have avoided the
actual accident that occurred had the instruction been seen and fol-
lowed."' 2 This is a particular problem, given the constraints which
always exist on the amount of warnings that can be given.83 In this
regard, the authors praise a Louisiana decision affirming a manufac-
turer's verdict in a case involving a power drill.84 A warning on the
79. Id. at 61.
80. For the authors' emphasis on this point, see id. at 61.
81. I am grateful to my student, Paul Janaskie, for his thoughts on this point.
Memorandum from Paul Janaskie, Northwestern University School of Law, Class of
1993, to Marshall S. Shapo (August 1991) (on file with author).
82. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 61.
83. See id. at 62 n.41. Judge Williams provides one of the best commentaries on
the problem of warnings dilution in Cotton v. Buckeye Prods. Co., 840 F.2d 935, 938-940
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
84. Id. (summarizing Broussard v. Continental Oil Co., 433 So. 2d 354 (La. Ct.
tool enjoined the user: "CAUTION: For Safe Operation See
Owner's Manual." Among the instructions in the manual was a
statement that one should not use the product the way the plaintiff
used it, and the court mentioned "the problem of attempting to put
multiple warnings on a hand drill of the size and nature involved." It
is certainly fair to employ such a decision as an example of the prob-
lem of "constraint of label space." 85 However, a consistent reader of
cases on the subject would immediately ask, given the facts summa-
rized, whether there were some other appropriate, and more parsi-
monious, explanation for the outcome. For example, using traditional
doctrinal categories, one might theorize that the true reason for the
manufacturer's judgment was misuse, or contributory negligence, or
a judicial belief that the product had no defect.
In a somewhat gnarled summary paragraph on the general prob-
lem of warnings issues, the authors declare that "[t]he question is
whether this commitment to consumer sovereignty should survive an
explicit recognition of the fact that any feasible warning must leave
consumers with much of the responsibility for buying safe products
and for using products safely." '88 It would have been helpful to have
examples of how this abstract statement would apply in particular
cases.
The authors' section on "criteria for hazard warnings" '8 7 stimu-
lates a rather general comment as to the relationship of warnings
and design defects. Specifically, this is the suggestion that frequently
what are characterized as warnings issues mask questions which are
appropriately chalked up under the design defect heading. If that is
so, then an appropriate solution would be closer judicial analysis and
more straightforward recognition of that point.
The authors speak of "the need. . . for a comprehensive warnings
policy that (a) ranks all the risks the particular product poses and
requires warnings whose length varies directly with the seriousness
of the risk, and (b) ranks products generally in relation to the risks
they pose."88 The authors assert that "[s]uch a policy cannot evolve
effectively through common law adjudication." 89 However, it is not
at all clear that such a policy would evolve more "effectively" under
other auspices than under the warnings law currently being devel-
oped by courts. This writer has already acknowledged that warnings
law has a certain fuzziness about it, but any student of the cases can
discern a struggle by the courts to reach a consensus on the true
App.), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 726 (La. 1983)).
85. See id.
86. Id. at 63.
87. See id. at 63-66.
88. Id. at 69.
89. Id.
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issues about warnings and to try to discern from strings of particular
cases as comprehensive a policy as specific facts will permit.90
XII. OBEISANCE TO REGULATION
The authors' strategy for a comprehensive warnings policy empha-
sizes a proposal to exculpate defendants who comply "with specific
government regulations respecting the form and content of product
warnings."91 Although a later chapter of the Study discussed the
"shortcomings" of regulation,92 this suggestion seemed to override
the many objections to complete reliance on any regulatory frame-
work: the problem of the captive agency, the problem of outright
bribery, the hazard of insufficient analysis of specific products by
agencies. The authors do say they would require a defendant "to
show that it did not withhold information from the agency in the
proceeding that generated the regulation, but rather cooperated fully
during the regulatory process."93 One may observe that this would
presumably be a place where a significant amount of the litigation
on the subject would ordinarily focus.
Attached to their proposal to make compliance with regulations
exculpatory is the authors' declaration of "[t]he ideal" as being "to
require each firm to produce safety until its own marginal costs and
benefits of further production were equal."'94 This exclusive focus on
the producer seems to remove any consideration of the nature and
qualities of the receptor of warning messages: the consumer.
The authors return to their obeisance to the expertise of regulators
with the assertion that agencies "usually have more" of that com-
modity "than do even well informed juries at assessing the communi-
cative impact of particular language and warning formats." ' 5 They
do not explain how this "expertise" necessarily will triumph over
politics in agency approval of particular warnings. They also do not
90. Some good illustrations of these struggles appear in the judicial development of
the "sophisticated user" doctrine, see 1 SLAPo, supra note 4, at 19.06[4]; in judicial
references to information costs as an element of decision, see id. at 19.081l]; and in the
effort to define the boundaries of defenses based on common knowledge of danger, id. at
19.10[l], [3] and "obviousness," id. at 119.11 [1]. The relevant essence of this case law
lies not in a high level of judicial agreement but in the discourse.
91. 2 ALI Study, supra note 1, at 72.
92. See 2 ALI STuDY, supra note 1, at 85-86.
93. Id. at 73.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 74.
indicate why agencies, under political pressure, are likely consist-
ently to perform better on this subject than juries informed by ex-
perts and trained advocates.
One could hardly disagree that "[c]onsideration should be
given" 96 to the creation of a uniform vocabulary on risk levels.97
Many practical problems, however, intrude on this suggestion by the
authors. The Study says that it should be "[t]he federal govern-
ment" that creates this "vocabulary." 9 8 One must ask, what part of
the federal government? Which agency? What kind of process?
At this point, we confront a problem inherent in any general study
of a legal system. Frequently, such analysis stumbles on the details,
wherein, we have been told, the Deity resides. Thus, one would ask
the authors whether they would require that in order to bar litiga-
tion, "uniform vocabulary" warnings must identify the specific risk
at issue and that they meet criteria of materiality. Perhaps most
poignantly, the authors give not a single example of a case in which
a uniform vocabulary would have changed results for the better.
Although my experience on the subject is personal and anecdotal,
I find it rather astonishing that the authors cite the Truth in Lending
Act as an example of the "benefits to providing information in stan-
dardized formats." 9 They instance the "particular approved format"
of "the annual percentage rate" under the Act.100 I would simply
note that in the process of my recent purchase of an automobile, I
was treated to a highly deceptive rendition of the presumably rele-
vant statistics on interest rates, a presentation that I suspect was
within the confines of the law.
Still, the authors' discussion of their proposals for a comprehensive
warnings policy engenders the belief that a uniform group of sym-
bols could be useful, particularly if the symbols channel people to
words that describe risks with some particularity. Yet, we must rec-
ognize that consumers frequently are likely to be overwhelmed as
much by a uniform vocabulary as by the warnings now given, which
after all come with the stamp of people who have a considerable
stake in making them effective, namely the producers. In this regard,
the point recurs that perhaps the warnings issue is often a surrogate
for other things, including the design defect issue.
Among other comments, the authors predict that courts which be-
come "more sensitive to the difficulties of communicating safety-re-
lated data in the context of mass consumer transactions" will
become "more reluctant to hold firms liable for failing to instruct
96. Id. at 82.
97. See id. at 74-76.
98. Id. at 74.
99. Id. at 75.
100. Id.
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consumers how to avoid very low-probability accidents." 10 1 It would
have been particularly useful to provide some examples on this point,
together with some commentary on the problem of the accident that
has very low probability but is likely to be extremely severe when it
happens. I would hypothesize that as the severity of injuries in-
creases, it will lessen the tendency of courts to be more lenient to-
ward defendants even as the probability of accidents decreases.
XIII. A FAILURE OF CRITICISM
A quite abstract statement in the penultimate sentence of the
chapter is particularly provocative. The authors say that the courts
"have foreclosed" policy choice on warnings issues "by intervening
extensively in consumer and labor markets based on judicial views
respecting what risk allocations would maximize safety and compen-
sation, views that are only partly correct."1 02 A statement of such
abstraction merits a response at the same level of generality. The
authors do not explain which views are "only partly correct," and
what parts of these views are correct and incorrect. Indeed, in the
chapter as a whole, they reveal little about their own views of the
premises, both articulate and inarticulate, that have underlaid judi-
cial decisionmaking in this area for the last thirty years. It seems
fair to comment that one cannot say where the courts have gone
wrong-if indeed they have strayed from the paths of justice-unless
one undertakes a sympathetic criticism of both their articulated rea-
soning, and their implicit premises.
XIV. CONCLUSION
This essay has sought to explore, under sharp focus, a product
designed as a blue-ribbon effort to improve the law. It has been rela-
tively critical in tone, but the writer is sympathetic to the authors on
the same grounds that the authors ought to have been more sympa-
thetic to the work product of the courts whose work they so summa-
rily criticize.
To put it simply, the defects of both this chapter and of the per-
formance of the judiciary over the last quarter century occur mainly
because of the difficulty of the subject. The key to analysis, espe-
cially for scholarly criticism, would appear to lie in a full recognition
of that difficulty, and in a balanced presentation of competing points
101. Id. at 81-82.
102. Id. at 82.
of view. Unfortunately, the Study lacks depth of historical focus, it
arguably does not take existing doctrine with sufficient seriousness,
and it suffers from some serious deficiencies in both terminology and
analysis. Moreover, it does not adequately summarize the grounds of
judicial concern that have generated the present body of products
liability law. Along with the Study's distressing failure to give suffi-
cient weight to competing points of view, one of its most serious de-
fects is its consistent failure to present specific and relevant
applications. Often it does not give examples where the text cries out
for illustration. Occasionally the examples are simply frivolous. And
in a way that might win debate points but seems insufficiently suited
to the gravity of the task and the forum, the Study has a tendency to
select the "egregious" example and to imply that it may be
illustrative.
From the standpoint of the difficulty of the undertaking, the chap-
ter merits our admiration for its ambition. However, despite its fre-
quent stylistic felicity, the effort appears to suffer from production
flaws, a lack of quality control, and ultimately, a pervasive series of
defects in design.
